2023

Постійне посилання на фонд

https://ela.kpi.ua/handle/123456789/62332

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Перегляд 2023 за Ключові слова "004.056.55"

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  • Ескіз
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    Cryptanalysis of the «Vershyna» Digital Signature Algorithm
    (Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute, 2023) Lytvynenko, Yuliia; Fesenko, Andrii
    The CRYSTALS-Dilithium digital signature algorithm, which was selected as the prototype of the new «Vershyna» digital signature algorithm, is analyzed in this paper. The characteristics of the National Digital Signature Standard Project and the construction of the «Vershyna» algorithm are also presented. During the analysis of the project, the predicted number of iterations that the algorithm must perform to create the correct signature was calculated. In addition, basic theoretical information about the structure of Fiat-Shamir with aborts and its security in quantum and classical models oracle models is also provided. We obtain our own results on the resistance of the «Vershyna» algorithm to the attack without the use of a message in classical and quantum oracle models. The resistance of the «Vershyna» algorithm to a key recovery attack is based on the assumption of the hardness of the MLWE problem, and the resistance to existential signature forgery is based on the assumption of the hardness of the MSIS problem. In this work, the expected level of hardness of SIS and LWE problems is calculated, to which there are reductions from MSIS and MLWE problems.
  • Ескіз
    ДокументВідкритий доступ
    The Quantum Distinguishing Attacks on Generalized Feistel Schemes
    (Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute, 2023) Zvychaina, A.; Fesenko, A.
    It turned out that in addition to problems with classical asymmetric cryptography in the post-quantum period, there are certain doubts about the strength of symmetric cryptographic schemes. This paper demonstrates that on Type III Generalized Feistel Scheme (GFS), by selectively fixing specific parts of the plaintext at the input to the GFS, it is possible to reduce the problem of distinguishing between random text and encrypted output of the same GFS to the Simon problem through different approaches. Our method enables the cracking of the cipher up to d rounds in polynomial time, while a more sophisticated approach based on different formulas from other paths of the cipher can crack d + 1 rounds with the same time complexity in quantum adversary model. These distinct approaches yield varying results in terms of scheme security, indicating the potential to break more rounds in the GFS using the same methodology.